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The Market for User Data 
Olivier Sylvain* 
Policymakers are today far more alert than ever before to the 
myriad ways in which tech companies collect and distribute 
consumers’ data with third-party data brokers and advertisers. We 
can attribute this new awareness to at least two major news stories 
from the past six or so years. The first came in 2013, when Edward 
Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor, leaked 
highly classified materials that revealed the ways in which United 
States national security officials, with the indispensable cooperation 
of U.S. telecommunications companies, systematically monitored 
telephone conversations and electronic communications of U.S. 
citizens and foreign nationals.1 The story triggered a series of 
rebukes from civil rights groups, consumer advocates, and foreign 
leaders around the world. It is not clear whether or the extent to 
which the NSA or other government agencies have terminated those 
programs since Snowden’s revelation.2  
The second came in early 2018, when another whistleblower 
revealed to journalists that researchers to whom Facebook had 
allowed to collect and study dozens of millions of users’ personal 
data, in turn, shared those troves of personal data with Cambridge 
Analytica, a political consultancy firm.3 Cambridge Analytica had 
 
*  Professor at Fordham University School of Law and Director of the McGannon Center 
for Communications Research. 
1 See Julia Angwin et al., AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/us/politics/att-helped-nsa-
spy-on-an-array-of-internet-traffic.html [https://perma.cc/AXJ8-RZ6P]. 
2 Ryan Gallagher & Henrik Moltke, The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs 
in Eight US Cities, The Intercept (June 25, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/25/att-
internet-nsa-spy-hubs/ [https://perma.cc/VY6V-Y5UL]. 
3 Carole Cadwalladr, ‘I Made Steve Bannon’s Psychological Warfare Tool’: Meet the 
Data War Whistleblower, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2018, 05:44 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-
wylie-faceook-nix-bannon-trump [https://perma.cc/MW6Q-YSV2]. 
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promoted their access to this data to peddle “psychographic 
targeting” to political campaigns, including that of Donald Trump 
in 2016.4 This more recent revelation has exposed Facebook to what 
will likely be the largest fine imposed by the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) in history.5 
These stories were about the extraordinary misuse and abuse of 
consumer data by powerful tech companies. But they also are large-
scale demonstrations of the Private-Sector Ecosystem of User 
Data—the theme of the fall 2018 symposium to which this volume 
of the Fordham IPLJ is committed. At a minimum, these recent 
episodes, along with others, have dramatically raised our collective 
awareness about the ways in which consumer data has become the 
lifeblood of the networked information environment. 
Two decades ago, scholars and writers wondered whether online 
tech companies would ever find a sustainable business model. It 
appears, however, that, even at that time, some savvy entrepreneurs 
were on to something. DoubleClick, which is now owned by 
Alphabet, for example, had already developed techniques to track 
users’ web browsing activity across their hundreds of affiliated 
sites.6 There, of course, was nothing novel in the idea of an 
advertising-based business model; advertising has defined the 
political economy of the media and communications industry at 
least since the nineteenth century. But, at the turn of the century, it 
was not evident to anyone but just a relatively few scholars and 
entrepreneurs in the start-up world that targeted behavioral 
advertising would have purchase in the networked information 
economy.7 
 
4 Sue Halpern, Cambridge Analytica and the Perils of Psychographics, NEW YORKER 
(Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/cambridge-analytica-and-
the-perils-of-psychographics [https://perma.cc/7AZG-KHDM]. 
5  Mike Isaac and Cecilia Kang, Facebook Expects to Be Fined Up to $5 Billion by 
F.T.C. Over Privacy Issues, N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019
/04/24/technology/facebook-ftc-fine-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/2V9V-63AG].  
6 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
7 See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic 
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771 (1999); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving 
Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 
(1999); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. 
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1994). 
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Two decades later, companies have been refining the 
advertising-based business model. They have been developing ever 
more powerful algorithmic processes for harvesting, trading on, and 
exploiting personal consumer data for advertisers.8 These 
computational techniques have empowered firms to collect 
extraordinary amounts of consumer data, anticipate consumer 
preferences based on that data, and microtarget advertising to 
individual users based on those predictions.9 It is all a marketer’s 
dream. And, if click-through rates are to be believed, consumers are 
sold.10 
WHEN ALGORITHMS GO AWRY 
But sometimes these algorithms make mistakes. While these 
errors are often innocuous, they are occasionally tone-deaf, as when 
Virginia Eubanks, who wrote a marvelous book about the ways in 
which algorithmic decisionmaking processes can be disastrous for 
the most vulnerable among us, received an advertisement for her 
own book.11 Sometimes their mistakes are in very poor taste and 
offensive, as when Facebook created an advertisement out of a 
violently misogynistic Instagram post originally sent to a prominent 
female tech reporter.12 Or when a social media algorithm distributed 
 
8 See, e.g., TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE 
OUR HEADS (2016). 
9 See Zeynep Tufekci, How Recommendation Algorithms Run the World, WIRED (Apr. 
22, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/how-recommendation-algorithms-run-the-world/ 
[https://perma.cc/2ZFS-JFPD]. 
10 See Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, People Want Personalised Recommendations (Even as 
They Worry about the Consequences), DIGITAL NEWS REPORT (2016), 
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/essays/2016/people-want-personalised-
recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/3YP9-Q7NM]. 
11  See @PopTechWorks, TWITTER (May 14, 2010, 1:11 PM), https://twitter.com
/PopTechWorks/status/1128392383966654464 [https://perma.cc/A3VH-YQAF]. 
12 See Sam Levin, Instagram Uses ‘I Will Rape You’ Post as Facebook Ad in Latest 
Algorithm Mishap, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2017/sep/21/instagram-death-threat-facebook-olivia-solon 
[https://perma.cc/55EM-X227]. 
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an advertisement for gay conversion therapy to members of the 
LGBTQ community.13 
Sometimes companies purposefully design their advertisements 
to target audiences in ways that, while lawful and rational, are 
unseemly. For example, in 2012, Orbitz, the travel fare aggregator, 
relied on consumer data to steer Mac users to pricier hotels on the 
finding that such users spend 30% more on hotels than PC users.14 
Price discrimination is not illegal, for the most part, but selective 
marketing techniques like these consumers are hardly harmless to 
those who are systematically chosen to pay more than others or, for 
that matter, to those who are never exposed to fancier lodging. Much 
more recently, we learned that Netflix tested advertising about 
movies based on their various audiences’ race and gender by, for 
example, emphasizing black characters to black audiences even 
when those characters play minor roles.15 
Every now and again, algorithmic microtargeting enables or 
encourages violations of law. Just this past spring, for example, 
Facebook agreed to settle a series of lawsuits that alleged that its Ad 
Manager generated marketing classifications that made it possible 
for advertisers to discriminate against people on the basis of 
protected categories like race, gender, and age in violation of civil 
rights laws.16 The social media company had harvested and analyzed 
 
13 See Mary Elizabeth Williams, Facebook Removes Ads for Gay Conversion Therapy 
After Backlash, SALON (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/08/31/facebook-
removes-ads-for-gay-conversion-therapy-after-backlash/ [https://perma.cc/UN8S-G36C]. 
14 See Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. 
JOURNAL (Aug. 23, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023044586045
77488822667325882 [https://perma.cc/E6TT-8JXA]. 
15 See Lucas Shaw & Jordyn Holman, Netflix Denies Tailoring Its Movie Promotions 
Based on Race (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-
22/netflix-denies-tailoring-movie-promotions-based-on-users-race 
[https://perma.cc/38ZT-ZVJF]. 
16 See Katie Benner, Glenn Thrush & Mike Isaac Facebook Engages in Housing 
Discrimination With Its Ad Practices, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/us/politics/facebook-housing-discrimination.html 
[https://perma.cc/UA5C-FKX9]. In the settlement, Facebook did not admit legal 
wrongdoing, but it nevertheless agreed, among other things, to discontinue its use of those 
categories in markets for housing, employment, and credit. See id.; see also Olivier 
Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, EMERGING THREATS SERIES, KNIGHT FIRST 
AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (Apr. 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org
/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data [https://perma.cc/8QD5-AF3P]. 
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its consumers’ data to generate the unlawful categories. It is 
impossible that the vast majority of users wanted data about them to 
be used in this way. 
Microtargeting techniques present challenges as much as they 
provide opportunities. So much of the algorithmic outputs depend 
on the data on which their designers “train” them.17 If the algorithms 
do not learn from their masters to be law-abiding, those algorithms 
will of course break the law. 
The same might be said about other classes of user information, 
including biometric data which can, on the one hand, be inputs 
through which algorithms might keep us safer and create new 
efficiencies.18 (See, for example, fingerprinting on iPhones.) But, in 
the wrong hands, biometric data also can enable discrimination 
against classes of people.19 This is to say nothing of the variety of 
ways in which the technology is easily susceptible to abuse by 
governments and private actors. This is why facial recognition 
technology may very well be too difficult to administer in 
democracies with longstanding constitutional commitments to 
procedural and substantive fairness.20 
 
17 See generally AI Now, DISCRIMINATING SYSTEMS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN AI 
(Apr. 2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/discriminatingsystems.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S93-
FGA4]. 
18  See Elizabeth Joh, Want to See My Genes? Get a Warrant, N.Y. Times (June 11, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/opinion/police-dna-warrant.html [https://
perma.cc/37AH-N6QR]; James O’Neill, How Facial Recognition Makes You Safer, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/opinion/facial-recognition-
police-new-york-city.html [https://perma.cc/QM34-Y5E3]. 
19 See Joy Buolamwini, Artificial Intelligence Has a Problem with Gender and Racial 
Bias. Here’s How to Solve It., TIME (Feb. 7, 2019), http://time.com/5520558/artificial-
intelligence-racial-gender-bias/ [https://perma.cc/C9UX-BGDT]; Steve Lohr, Facial 
Recognition Is Accurate if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-
intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/4GAP-K5KH]. 
20 Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Amazon Needs to Stop Providing Facial 
Recognition Tech for the Government, MEDIUM (Jun. 21, 2018), 
https://medium.com/s/story/amazon-needs-to-stop-providing-facial-recognition-tech-for-
the-government-795741a016a6 [https://perma.cc/RXL3-DPK3]. See also Kate Conger, 
The Man Behind San Francisco’s Facial Recognition Ban Is Working on More. Way More., 
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/technology/facial-
recognition-san-francisco-ban.html [https://perma.cc/8KDW-ECWL]. 
1092         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1087 
 
WHERE AND HOW DOES LAW COME IN? 
 In the past couple of years, in light of mounting public concern, 
legislatures and regulators around the world have announced new 
protections for consumers. To be sure, consumers have had legal 
recourse since the nineteenth century.21 But, today, policymakers 
have sought reforms in recognition of the massive scale and 
distinctive nature of the private-sector ecosystem of consumer data.  
 The European Union has been at the forefront of this effort, 
enacting the comprehensive General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”).22 It has only been a year since that law has been in effect, 
but we can already identify the important trends.23 Under the GDPR, 
companies must give consumers (what the regulation calls “data 
subjects”) access to the data that they have about them, and ensure 
meaningful user consent to process that information.24 Consumers 
also have the right to withdraw this consent “at any time,”25 as well 
as the right to “rectification”26 and “erasure.”27 (These are concepts 
that had been set out in the now defunct EU Data Protection 
Directive and elaborated in the European Court of Justice’s pre-
GDPR opinions.28) The GDPR provides, moreover, that companies 
may not share a user’s data to third parties for any purposes that are 
 
21 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193 (1890). 
22 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 
1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
23 See, e.g., Mathew J. Schwartz, GDPR: Europe Counts 65,000 Data Breach 
Notifications So Far, GovInfo (May 16, 2019), https://www.govinfosecurity.com/gdpr-
europe-counts-65000-data-breach-notifications-so-far-a-12489#.XOKLGMyqUjo.twitter 
[https://perma.cc/7JVM-NW4B]. See generally EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD, 
First Overview on the Implementation of the GDPR and the Roles and Means of the 
National Supervisor Authorities (Mar. 18, 2019), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb
/files/files/file1/19_2019_edpb_written_report_to_libe_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LQ2-
RWMW]. 
24 GDPR, Ch. 2, Art 7. 
25 Id. 
26 GDPR, Ch. 16. 
27 GDPR, Ch. 17. 
28 European Union, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, (1995) 
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“incompatible” with the ones for which that user shared their data to 
begin with.29 The GDPR imposes significant fines for violations of 
its terms.30 Questions remain about the new law’s extraterritorial 
scope,31 but it nevertheless is a significant reform, at least because 
U.S.-based companies that do business in Europe have been forced 
to change their consumer data management practices. 
Federal lawmakers in the United States have not mustered a 
national consensus on anything that resembles the GDPR. Instead, 
here, federal privacy law has been sectoral for decades, with statutes 
addressing specific actors in delineated legislative fields through, 
for example, the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Financial 
Credit Reporting Act, and the Video Privacy Protection Act. 
For the past several decades, the FTC has relied on its organic 
statute to justify a wide range of enforcement actions and guidance 
for industry’s administration of consumer data.32 It has exercised 
this authority in fits and starts, largely because Congress 
substantially curtailed the agency’s ability to promulgate “notice 
and comment” rules in the area.33 In spite of the substantial hurdles 
imposed by Congress in 197534 the agency proposed this past March 
to fortify existing rules for the protection of “the privacy and 
security of customer information held by financial institutions.”35 It 
has also been in talks with Facebook following its investigation of 
 
29 GDPR, Ch. 2, Art. 5. 
30 GDPR, Ch. 8, Art. 83.  
31  See, e.g., Joshua Blume, A Contextual Extraterritoriality Analysis of the DPIA and 
DPO Provisions in the GDPR, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1425, 1446-55 (2019); Daphne Keller, 
The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data 
Protection Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 287, 348-51 (2018). 
32 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
33 See Magnuson Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act § 202, 
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. 57a–58 (1975)). 
34 Scholars have argued that Congress should increase the scope of the FTC’s authority. 
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). 
35 Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 84 Fed. Reg. 13158 (proposed 
Apr. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 314).  
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the Cambridge Analytica scandal.36 The size and nature of their 
sanction against the social media giant will reveal how far the 
agency is willing to go to vindicate its position as the primary federal 
protector of consumer data. 
State and city governments have stepped up in the absence of a 
comprehensive federal data protection law. Illinois became a leader 
among the states when, in 2008, its legislature passed the Biometric 
Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).37 As the title suggests, BIPA 
imposes strict duties on the collection and storage of consumers’ 
biometric data. It requires, among other things, that companies 
obtain consent from consumers to collect or disclose such 
information, destroy that data after a certain period of time, and 
securely store any information the company holds.38 California’s 
Consumer Privacy Protection Act (“CCPA”), which becomes 
effective in 2020, however, is probably the most sweeping state law 
to date, adopting many of the same protections set out in the GDPR, 
including the right of consumers to access the data that companies 
have about them, the right of consumers to have that data deleted, 
and the right to block the selling of the data.39 San Francisco, for its 
part, is among the few local governments that have altogether 
banned government agencies from employing facial recognition 
technology.40 New York is considering a similar ban on the use of 
facial recognition technology in public schools.41 
 
36 Cecilia Kang, Facebook Set to Create Privacy Positions as Part of F.T.C. Settlement, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/technology/facebook-
ftc-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/EX94-HQEJ]. 
37 Eileen King Bower, Theresa Le & James J. Moffitt, Illinois Leads the Way for 
Biometric Privacy Legislation, LEXOLOGY: CLYDE & CO LLP BLOG (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b3538a7e-e33b-49fd-b523-
a9608d12811f [https://perma.cc/P5NK-KJS3]. 
38 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008). 
39 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.175.  
40 Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial 
Recognition Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05
/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/K2KC-TZ3H]. 
41 See N.Y. Legis. Assemb. A-06787. Reg. Sess. 2019–2020 (2019); see also Davey 
Alba, The First Public Schools in the US Will Start Using Facial Recognition Next Week, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (May 29, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article
/daveyalba/lockport-schools-facial-recognition-pilot-aegis [https://perma.cc/LC36-
ZG3C].  
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Legislators and government regulators have not been the only 
reformers. The courts have played an important role in delineating 
the extent to which private companies today may share consumer 
data with government officials. Consider the Supreme Court’s 2018 
opinion in Carpenter v. United States.42 There, the Court held that 
law enforcement officials may only request and obtain subscribers’ 
historical mobile phone location data from telecommunications 
companies on a showing of probable cause.43  
Generally, under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement 
officials must have probable cause to search “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.”44 But, under the third-party doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has held that this probable cause standard does not 
apply to law enforcement requests for business records about 
consumer activity from banks and telecommunications providers.45 
The logic for this rule is relatively straightforward: the records that 
banks and telephone companies generate and collect about their 
consumers are an indispensable incident of the services they 
provide. Consumers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in those business records, the Court has explained, because they 
voluntarily give their data to banks and telephone companies in 
order to enjoy the services provided.46 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court decided not to extend the third-
party doctrine to historical mobile phone location data. In the 
aggregate, it explained, location information reveals an 
unprecedented amount about subscribers that far exceeds the kinds 
of information that justified the third-party doctrine.47 The Court did 
not do away with the doctrine. It only refused to extend it to mobile 
phone location, suggesting that the rule might be applied to other 
networked mobile technologies as well.48 
 
42 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
43 Id. at 2221.  
44 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
45 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (noncontent telephone records); United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records). 
46 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–744; Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. 
47 138 S.Ct. at 2220.  
48 Id. The Court considered whether the collection of location information for seven or 
more days required a warrant. It did not answer whether its decision would extend to 
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THE PRIVATE-SECTOR ECOSYSTEM OF USER DATA TODAY 
The GDPR, BIPA, the CCPA, and the Carpenter decision are 
good indications that policymakers and courts today are adapting 
current laws to meet the challenges posed by today’s networked 
information economy. Longstanding consumer protection norms 
like due process49 and “notice and consent,” for example, will 
continue to play a role, although there is growing evidence that the 
latter in particular is not especially protective of users.50 The 
question policymakers will have to answer is: what should count as 
consent, when so much remains unknown to consumers and 
regulators?51 In this vein, scholars have made the case for regulatory 
conventions like transparency and mandated impact assessments.52 
At least for now, these concerns—transparency and 
accountability—seem to be mobilizing voters and legislators.53 We 
might suppose that, no matter how we come out of this important 
constitutive moment, policymakers ought to foster trust between 
consumers and the commercial entities that hold and manage their 
personal data.54 But this is hardly an inevitable or necessarily 
optimal way of conceiving of data protection in light of the seductive 
commercial incentives to trade on access to consumer data.55 
 
requests for fewer than seven days. Id. at 2217, n.3 (Roberts, J., majority), 2234 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting).  
49 See, e.g., Danielle Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 
(2007). 
50 See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent, WASH. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
51 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
52 See, e.g., Andrew Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GEORGIA L. REV. 
109 (2017). 
53 See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski & Andrew D. Selbst, The Legislation That Targets the 
Racist Impacts of Tech, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07
/opinion/tech-racism-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/FL9Q-ZPX5]; Adi Robertson, A 
New Bill Would Force Companies to Check Their Algorithms for Bias, VERGE (Apr. 10, 
2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/10/18304960/congress-algorithmic-
accountability-act-wyden-clarke-booker-bill-introduced-house-senate 
[https://perma.cc/DW5D-ZLKX]. 
54 See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1183 (2016). See also ARI WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY 
FOR AN INFORMATION AGE (2018). 
55 See Lina Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
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Anyway, for consumers and data protection policymakers, the 
stakes seem especially high today because we are only now 
beginning to really comprehend the scale and pervasive integration 
of the market for user data. Techniques for the collection and 
distribution of user data define practically all of our experiences 
today—online and offline. It is not really until consumers and 
policymakers have a far better understanding of this scope that many 
of us can rest easy. The Fordham IPLJ symposium is one step in 
that direction. 
